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ABSTRACT 
Temple worship and geographical boundaries are unique features of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church).  Our research uses economic theory to understand 
how the organizational benefits of the temple recommend system and the geographical ward 
boundaries may solve the market failures associated with religious organizations.  These features 
of the LDS Church will be used to create a framework for understanding how the church limits 
free-riding and sub-optimal participation, which would result in increased efficiency and 
production of large religious benefits.  Because the market failures faced by the church are the 
same as those faced by other religious groups and similar to those faced by clubs, this research 
provides insights into possible solutions for groups besides the LDS church. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Many of us are quick to make the connection between economics and the economy, but 
those unfamiliar with the discipline are often unaware that microeconomics, in its most basic 
form, is a method of understanding how individuals and other entities decide to use scarce 
resources.  Economics provides mathematical models and avenues for empirical research.  Thus, 
it provides a paradigm to analyze purchasing behavior in consumers, production in businesses, 
and trading amongst nations.  Additionally, since individuals are forced to make decisions many 
different settings, economics provides, as Iannaccone (1994) says, a “new paradigm” for analysis 
in other fields.  Economics has thus expanded its domain and made profound insights in political 
science, health, criminology, and sociology, as well as in other disciplines.    
 This being said, most of us would think economics to be impractical in matters of 
worship and belief.  After all, spiritual matters are too intangible to be studied with the 
mathematical models used in economics.  However, worship does involve time and effort (scarce 
resources) in exchange for blessings (spiritual benefits), and religious congregations require 
organization.  It is these features, and others, that allow us to examine religion with economic 
theory.   
Economics has been influential in helping researchers understand the behavior of 
individuals within a religion, the organization of religious groups, and even so-called religious 
“markets”.  A few significant studies are mentioned briefly here.  In 1975, Azzi and Ehrenburg 
(1975) used a model of “afterlife consumption” to explain the rationality behind religious 
behavior.  Club theory has been used to show how religious organizations produce religious 
“capital.”  A largely ignored chapter in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) points out that if 
individual denominations function as religious firms (or clubs), then they collectively constitute 
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a religious “market” and can be analyzed as such.  Clearly, economics has much to say in 
spiritual matters. 
The analysis in this paper builds off of the work that has been done using club theory, 
particularly by Lawrence Iannaccone (1992) and Michael McBride (2007).  Iannaccone (1992 
and 1994) has written several papers showing that the relative strictness of fundamentalist-type 
churches is what has allowed them to grow at a rate significantly higher than their less strict 
competitors.  He proposes that this strictness limits the inefficiency caused by the free-rider 
problem inherent in religious organizations.   
McBride (2007) focuses on the relatively strict LDS (or Mormon) church in his analysis.  
He too proposes that the church’s success has been the result of solving the free-rider problem.  
However, he suggests that it is by forming a type of “menu” of goods within the church that the 
Mormons have become more efficient than otherwise.   
After providing a brief background of the LDS church and explaining the free-rider 
problem faced by religious organizations, we will use the temple recommend and geographic 
boundaries of the LDS church to develop a framework for analyzing its efficiency, perhaps 
accounting for its strength and possibly its relatively high growth rates. 
 
II. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE LDS CHURCH 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (also known as the Mormon Church) was 
founded in 1830 by Joseph Smith Jr.  At the time of its formal organization, it had only six 
members, meeting the minimum requirement of the state of New York, where it was formed.  A 
relatively small membership gathered in the Eastern United States before settling in the Great 
Basin in Utah in 1847.  From that small membership, the church has seen rapid growth 
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worldwide.  In 1947, membership reached 1 million.  It reached 2 million 16 years later, in 1963.  
In 1971, there were 3 million members worldwide.  This rapid growth has continued until now.  
Current membership is reported to be approximately 13.8 million. 
Although it is a Christian church, several beliefs and practices distinguish the LDS 
church from other Christian denominations and contribute to its “strictness”.  The Word of 
Wisdom prohibits the use of tobacco, alcohol, tea, and coffee.  The Law of Tithing requires that 
10% of members’ incomes be donated to the church.  The Law of Chastity prohibits sexual 
relationships outside of a legally recognized marriage.   
In addition to these beliefs, membership in the church demands a significant amount of 
members’ time and effort.  Sunday services, meetings, and other church programs demand a 
rather substantial time commitment.  In the Pew Forum Religious Landscape Survey, 75% of 
Mormons in the United States claim to attend church meetings once per week or more, a 
percentage only surpassed by the Jehovah Witnesses.  Eighty-two percent of Mormons claim to 
pray daily, again only surpassed by Jehovah Witnesses.  Of course, adherence to all these 
practices is strictly voluntary, but indirect enforcement exists; a fact that we will analyze later.     
In sociology, the LDS church is generally classified as a sect.  The classification system 
classifies an organization as a church or a sect, according to the stringency of the group’s 
demands.  Those groups whose stringency places their members at odds with the prevailing 
culture are classified as sects.  As stated in the introduction, this “strictness” has been used to 
explain the relative success and growth of sects versus churches. 
 To begin our analysis of how the LDS church sufficiently solves the free-rider problem, 
we must first understand what the problem is and why it exists. 
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III. THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM IN CLUBS 
Adam Smith, the Scottish philosopher often regarded as the father of economics, wrote in 
his famous book, Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations (1776): 
“Every individual endeavors to employ his capital so that its produce  
may be of greatest value.  He generally neither intends to promote the 
 public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it.  He intends  
only his own security, only his own gain.  And he is in this led by an  
invisible hand to promote an end, which has no part of his intention.   
By pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes that of society  
more effectually that when he really intends to promote it.”   
This quote captures one of the fundamental ideas of economic analysis.  The simple idea 
is what allows decision making to be analyzed at the individual, corporate, and national levels.  
We simply make the assumption that individuals and other entities decide to use their resources 
in the way that maximizes their return.  It is important to realize what Adam Smith means when 
he says that the individual “intends only his own security, only his own gain.”  What he means is 
that the individual assesses the individual costs and individual benefits associated with each 
option.   
For an example of this type of decision-making behavior, take Jim, a hypothetical 
university student.  When Jim decides to drive his car to school, rather than ride his bike, he is 
comparing costs and benefits to him personally that result from this decision.  If he decides that 
the cost-benefit ratio for driving (e.g. gas money vs. speed and convenience) is more favorable 
than the ratio for biking (energy, time vs. inexpensiveness), he will drive his car.  Economic 
theory suggests that, as Adam Smith pointed out earlier, individual rational behavior as described 
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above results in the efficient allocation of resources.  Whether or not this efficiency is “optimal” 
depends on what the reader believes is optimal.  For our analysis, we will assume that efficiency 
is beneficial and thus desired by the groups under examination.  However, it should be noted that 
it is possible for groups to sacrifice efficiency to promote other causes.   
   Market failures exist when external costs and benefits exist.  In our example, Jim does 
not take into account the cost (external to him) imposed on others by the pollution his car 
generates.  This is an example of an external cost.  When external costs are present, individual 
choice does not lead to socially optimum (efficient) outcomes.  For example, it may be rational 
for Jim to drive his car to school (individual benefits exceed individual costs) but this result may 
not be socially efficient since the social costs associated with this decision may exceed social 
benefits.  Goods associated with external costs (in the absence of restraints) are produced in a 
higher quantity than would be socially optimal.   
External benefits also cause non-optimal outcomes.  University-level education is an 
excellent example of a good with external benefits.  Not only does the education provide direct 
benefits for the student, but it also creates more informed voters, statistically safer communities, 
and more productive citizens.  Goods like this are typically produced less than would be socially 
optimal (a fact which will be shown later).  In the education example, the government intervenes 
with grants, low interest on student loans, and other incentives in order to solve for this market 
failure.  Here, we will show how external benefits cause this inefficiency. 
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Figure 1: Marginal Cost/Benefit Analysis 
of an individual obtaining education. Take an individual’s decision to 
obtain more education.  Figure 1 
employs a simple cost- benefit analysis 
to illustrate the effect of a positive 
externality associated with an 
individual’s decision to obtain 
education.  A rational individual will 
choose to obtain education until he/she 
reaches the point where the marginal 
private cost (MPC) of obtaining more 
education equals marginal private 
benefit (MPB).  Because of its public good nature, education yields benefits external to the 
individual; i.e., marginal social benefits (MSB) are greater than marginal private benefit.  
Because individual rational behavior is based on personal benefits and not on social benefits, the 
individual obtains the amount of education marked as QP even though QS is the socially optimal 
level.  
s 
h 
ividual’s time, 
enthusi
members have an incentive to free-ride.  An agent is said to be free-riding when it does not pay 
                                                           
How do external benefits affect religious groups?  We must first understand worship a
the production of spiritual, social, and other benefits.  For convenience, we will refer to suc
benefits as religious benefits.  The inputs of this production include the ind
asm, adherence to certain practices, and other aspects of worship.   
We also must view the religious group as a club, in the economic sense of the term1.  
Religious benefits are therefore defined as club goods.  One characteristic of a club is that its 
 
1 For an explanation of clubs, non-rivalrous goods, and excludability, see Appendix 1. 
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its share of the cost of producing a club good.  Free-riding is the result of the external benefits 
associated with club goods.   
We will use game-theoretic analysis to show how external benefits cause free-riding in 
religious organizations, and therefore, clubs in general.  Assume that we have a religious group 
with only two members, Member A and Member B.  For the sake of simplicity, we will assume 
each member has only two options in the church, they can either contribute fully or not at all 
(shirk).  In terms of dollars, the efforts of contributing cost each member $3, and, since it 
requires no effort, let shirking cost nothing.  When both members contribute fully, their 
collective efforts produce six dollars worth of non-rivalrous benefits2 (the more contributing 
members the better).  However, if only one of them contributes while the other one shirks, only 4 
dollars worth of benefits are produced (the quality of the church services decrease as few 
members contribute).  If neither of them contributes, two dollars of benefits are produced on 
account of the members just showing up (social benefits, etc).  Since the benefits are non-
excludable within the club, both enjoy full benefits whether they contribute or shirk.  That is to 
say, even if only one of the members contributes fully, the shirking member still enjoys the full 
four dollars at no cost.   
Figure 2 summarizes the different outcomes in terms of net benefits (benefits minus 
cost).  The ordered pairs each represent Member A’s payoff first, followed by Member B’s.  For 
example, when Member B shirks while Member A contributes, they collectively produce four 
dollars.  Member A’s payoff is one dollar ($4 – $3).  Member B’s is four dollars ($4 – $0).  The 
payoffs have been calculated for each of the four different situations.     
 
                                                            
2 To be a non-rivalrous good, consumption of the good by one individual does not decrease the amount of the good 
available to others.  See Appendix 1. 
7 
 
   
 
 Member B 
  Contribute Shirk 
Member A 
Contribute (3, 3) (1, 4) 
Shirk (4, 1) (2, 2)* 
Figure 2: Religious Group Game 
 
The production numbers we assumed above make sense once we have calculated the 
payoffs.  They lead to an appropriate ranking of each outcome.  Member A’s best outcome (4) is 
if he shirks and Member B contributes.  The next-best outcome (3) for Member A would be if 
both individuals contributed.  The worst outcome (1) would be for him to contribute while 
Member B shirks.  Thus, the values in the matrix represent the ordinal ranking of each of the four 
different outcomes for both members.   
This particular game assumes that neither player knows how the other will act.  If 
Member B contributes, Member A would be better off if he had shirked rather than contributed 
($4 instead of $3).  If Member B shirks, Member A would still be better off if he had shirked ($2 
versus $1).  Game theory states that a player will play his best strategy given that the other player 
is playing her best strategy.  Member A’s best strategy is to shirk.  If Member A shirks, it is also 
Member B’s best strategy to shirk.   
Even when the game is repeated over and over again, the players’ best strategy is still to 
shirk.  It may make sense for the two members to collaborate and decide to contribute fully, but 
even then, each member can benefit by breaking the deal (letting the other contribute while he 
shirks).  Thus, neither member can trust the other to keep his end of the deal.  Free-riding will 
still result.  
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These results can be extended to show that a group with many heterogeneous members 
and different available levels of contribution will also be plagued with incentives to free-ride.  In 
such a group, the individual incentives to free-ride will be dependent on how different 
individuals value the religious benefits of contributing.  Members who value the benefits 
relatively high will be more committed and thus contribute more than less committed members.  
This is not to say that the high-commitment members are behaving irrationally.  They simply 
derive greater utility from the religious benefits than do low-commitment members.  Therefore, 
low-commitment members will have a strong incentive to free-ride on the efforts of high-
commitment members.  High-commitment members will also contribute less because of the 
external benefits associated with their efforts.       
 Free-riding is a problem because (like in the example with education) it leads to sub-
optimal equilibriums.  In our example with Member A and Member B, the game-theoretic 
equilibrium (or Nash equilibrium) is where both members shirk, and production of religious 
benefits is two dollars.  An efficient equilibrium (or Pareto equilibrium) is where neither player 
can gain without the other player losing.  The free-riding equilibrium is not Pareto efficient 
because if each member contributes, both members gain and neither loses ($3 each instead of 
$2).   
 We have shown that the external benefits in clubs, religious groups to be specific, lead to 
free-riding and inefficient outcomes.  In order to succeed, a religious group must become 
efficient by sufficiently overcoming the free-rider problem.  Next we will examine several 
suggested solutions to the problem, before proposing how the temple recommend and 
geographical boundaries solve the problem. 
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IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM 
Lawrence Iannaccone (1992) suggests that a religion’s strictness partially solves the 
problem and thus accounts for the success of fundamentalist churches in American history.  His 
model examines an individual’s choice with respect to two goods, religious participation and 
secular consumption.  He claims that by means of restrictions and penalties (strictness), a church 
increases the cost of secular activities, which, given his two good model, implies that the 
marginal cost of religious participation decreases.   
Figure 3 illustrates Iannaccone’s model with a 
cost-benefit analysis.  The graph is similar to 
Figure 1, except here we are analyzing religious 
participation rather than education.   Increased 
marginal cost of secular consumption results in 
decreased marginal cost of participation in the 
religious group.  The new equilibrium is shifted 
to the right (QF), closer to the optimal QS.  
Notice, however, that the new marginal cost 
curve also yields a new optimum to the right of QS.  In his paper, Iannaccone appropriately refers 
to this “strictness” method as a “second best solution” to the positive externality problem.   
Figure 3: Correcting for 
externalities by strictness. 
Does Iannaccone’s two-good model accurately describe real world behavior?  His results 
appear to be dependent on his two-good model (i.e., a religious good and a secular good.)  Is it 
reasonable that prohibiting tobacco and alcohol increases the cost of all secular activity?  For 
instance, the resources and time spent smoking and drinking could be spent water-skiing just as 
easily as they could be spent praying.  Since most restrictions imposed by churches only prohibit 
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specific behaviors rather than all non-religious activities, the two-good model has limitations.  
Others, including Marwell (1996), also have problems with Iannaccone’s hypothesis.   
McBride focuses his analysis on the LDS church.  He suggests that some of the religious 
benefits can be made excludable.  For example, certain benefits can be only available if the 
member meets a certain minimum of hours committed to the group per week.  This would 
exclude those members not willing to contribute that much time in return for the benefits (i.e. 
low-commitment members).   
This seems to be a simple answer.  If the problem is due to the non-excludable nature of 
the club goods, making the goods excludable should solve the problem.  However, it is not this 
simple.  In the case of a religious organization, it may be impractical to monitor the members’ 
contribution.  In some cases it may be unethical to do so.  It would also be unethical to charge 
money (a form of exclusion) in return for religious benefits.   
McBride suggests that although some benefits are difficult to make excludable, some are 
rather easy to exclude.  As a result, the church is able to create a type of “menu” of benefits.  A 
well designed menu would get each individual to contribute more than he or she would under 
any other menu.  High-commitment members would be rewarded with excludable benefits and 
thus have the incentive to continue their high levels of contribution.  Those that didn’t value 
those excludable benefits would still receive other benefits.   
McBride’s menu solution is very similar to how we believe the temple recommend 
functions to solve the free-rider problem.  Next we show how the temple recommend increases 
efficiency.  We will use two different models to do so.   
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V. THE TEMPLE RECOMMEND AS A SOLUTION TO THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM 
Temple worship is a major characteristic of the LDS faith.  For the members of the 
church, the temple is different than the chapels they use for weekly worship and other meetings.  
An ecclesiastical leader and scholar of the church, James E. Talmage (2001), wrote:   
“Both by derivation and common usage the term temple, in its  
literal application, is of restricted and specific meaning. The essential  
idea of a temple is and ever has been that of a place specially set  
apart for service regarded as sacred, and of real or assumed sanctity;  
in a more restricted sense, a temple is a building constructed for and  
exclusively devoted to sacred rites and ceremonies.” 
Currently, there are 130 operating temples around the world, with eight more under 
construction, and 14 announced to be built soon.  The temple is where members receive what 
they believe to be the greatest of God’s blessings.  However, not just any individual or member 
of the Mormon faith can enter a Mormon temple.  One must be in good standing with the church 
and have an interview with a church authority to verify this standing.  The interview verifies that 
the individual is observing required practices and attending necessary meetings.   It is through 
these interviews that a member obtains a temple recommend.  The temple recommend then acts 
as the member’s “license” to engage in temple worship.  The recommend is typically valid for 
one or two years.  The LDS temple recommend will be an integral part of our economic model 
explaining the church’s efficiency. 
The temple recommend makes the benefits of temple worship excludable.  Only members 
who contribute enough to obtain a temple recommend are able to enter the temple and enjoy the 
benefits thereof.  The benefits produced within the temple club are non-excludable within the 
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club, but excludable to those members who don’t meet the minimum requirements of the temple 
recommend.  Thus the temple recommend effectively creates club within a club.   
 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Temple Recommend 
Figure 4: Temple Recommend 
on Market Equilibrium 
For a simple explanation of how this works, we will employ a cost-benefit analysis.  
Consider temple worship and regular church participation as two separate markets.  We have 
already examined the free-rider problem associated with regular participation.  However, the 
atmosphere of temple worship is not the social atmosphere found in regular church attendance.  
Instead, it is a much more personal activity.  This difference makes it reasonable to assume that 
free-riding is not a problem (or at least is not as serious a problem) in the market for temple 
worship.  To better understand the difference, imagine attending church services with no other 
members in attendance.  The external benefits of others’ participation are obvious.  This is not 
the case with temple worship.  Many members would not feel any less satisfaction attending the 
temple with no one else present.  Many might actually prefer it.  With this in mind, we will 
assume there are no external benefits associated with 
temple worship.   
The temple recommend works as a 
licensing mechanism.  Licenses to attend 
the temple are distributed to those who 
meet the minimum requirements of 
regular participation.  Preferably, this 
minimum is set at QS (see Figure 4), 
socially optimal amount of participation.  
the 
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As high-commitment members increase participation in order to obtain the temple recommend, 
the social optimum is achieved, and efficiency is reached. 
This socially efficient level of participation changes as the marginal benefit and marginal 
cost curves change with time and other factors.  To maintain efficiency, the church would have 
to adapt to these changes by resetting the minimum amount of participation necessary for temple 
worship.  Historically, LDS church officials have adjusted temple recommend requirements 
several times.  These adjustments may be interpreted as the church’s reaction to the changing 
social optimum. 
 
Game Theoretic Analysis of the Temple Recommend   
Now we will introduce the idea that, besides the recommend, the church produces several 
other excludable benefits.  These include the priesthood (authority within the church available to 
all males over 12) and assignments to respected positions (or callings) in the lay ministry.  These 
benefits, like the temple recommend, are obtained only after meeting certain minimum 
requirements.  Although they are excluded, the minimum requirements are slightly different and 
less costly than those that are required of temple recommend holders.  
The benefits of temple attendance, together with the priesthood and other excludable 
benefits, form the “menu” of benefits proposed by McBride.  It is particularly interesting that this 
is a type of vertical menu.  Whereas other clubs might offer menus featuring different benefits to 
suit the various interests of club members, the church offers a vertical menu.  Instead of being 
able to choose between different sub-clubs, the members of the church simply choose whether or 
not to add to the benefits they are already entitled to.  Once they move up one level, the benefits 
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of the previous level are still theirs to enjoy, and the benefits of the current level are added to 
them. 
The exact number of levels within this menu is difficult to quantify.  For our analysis, we 
will assume there are just three levels.  We stated previously that the temple recommend 
effectively creates a club within a club.  This has a significant effect on the efficiency of the club.  
To show this, we will expand on the example with Member A and Member B that was used 
earlier. 
We propose that, unlike the club depicted with the matrix in Figure 2, the priesthood and 
respectable positions in the church add a degree of excludability to the religious benefits 
produced by the religious club.  By virtue of being a member of the church, each member is 
entitled to various benefits of the church, regardless of their level of commitment or contribution.  
However, members cannot completely free-ride off the efforts exerted by others.  In a way, the 
church punishes free-riders by excluding priesthood and callings from them.  The effects of this 
exclusion are shown below. 
We will use a modified version of the two-member club we examined before.  The same 
production possibilities ($6, $4, or $2) still exist.  However, in this club, two dollars of 
excludable benefits (priesthood/callings) are produced when at least one of the members 
contributes.  The two dollars are included in the six or four dollars of total benefits.  For 
example, if Member A contributes and Member B shirks, total production is still six dollars.  
Member A’s payoff is still one dollar ($4 – $3).  However, Member B’s payoff is now two 
dollars.  This is because two of the four dollars are excludable, leaving only two dollars of non-
excludable benefits.  Because he didn’t contribute, Member B is only receives the non-
excludable two dollars.  In other words, Member B is not able to completely free-ride off 
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Member A’s efforts, and vice versa.  Figure 5 is the same type of matrix we saw earlier 
illustrating the incentive to free-ride in a club. 
   
  Member B 
  Contribute Shirk 
Member A 
Contribute (3, 3)*  (1, 2)  
Shirk (2, 1)  (2, 2)*  
Figure 5: LDS Church w/ exclusion
 
This game illustrates what happens if members are excluded from receiving some of the 
benefits of others’ contributions when they themselves do not contribute.  If Member A shirks 
while Member B contributes, Member A is only entitled to $2 of benefits rather than the $4 that 
were produced.  If this is the case, the only way for Member A to receive high benefits is to 
contribute.   
Notice that this game has two Nash equilibriums.  Neither member has a dominant 
strategy.  When the other is contributing, it is in the best interest of the other to contribute as 
well.  When the one shirks, the other will shirk as well.  As this game is repeated, it is possible 
for the members to collaborate and decide to contribute fully.  Neither member would be able to 
shirk without making himself worse off.  Thus, each member could trust the other to contribute 
as long as he himself does.  This collaboration may or may not be practical in larger groups.   
With this in mind, it is worth noting that the church’s teachings and doctrines place 
strong emphasis on the importance of service (callings) and the priesthood.  In fact, such strong 
emphasis on the priesthood that entrance into what LDS members believe is the highest degree 
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of salvation in contingent on whether a man has the priesthood or not.  Leaders within the local 
congregations actively identify and contact what they call “prospective elders” in an attempt to 
help non-priesthood holders become qualified to obtain the priesthood.  These practices may be 
understood as a way for the church to encourage the Nash equilibrium where members contribute 
rather than shirk.   
Culture also plays a crucial role, especially in regions densely populated with members of 
the LDS church.  A member’s calling or position in the priesthood is very visible to the other 
members in the community or congregation.  A certain degree of dishonor or shame would be an 
incentive for free-riders to begin contributing, if only to obtain the priesthood or a respected 
calling.  This, like the teachings mentioned above, would also work to maintain the equilibrium 
where members’ best strategy is to contribute rather than shirk3. 
Now we will introduce the temple recommend and temple worship.  Temple worship is a 
highly excluded good.  It forms a church within, but separate from, the rest of the church.  Those 
holding recommends are given access to what members belief are the greatest of God’s gifts 
available in this life.  These benefits are of greater worth, but also require more inputs, than the 
benefits available to non-recommend holders.  Different members value the temple benefits 
differently.  Some don’t value them enough to make them worth the inputs and elect not to 
obtain one.     
For this next game, we will build upon the matrix in Figure 5.  In this club, we feature the 
temple, and three contribution levels result: high-effort, low-effort, and shirk.  Low-effort is what 
we originally stated was full contribution, but temple worship requires additional inputs.  Since 
                                                            
3 With this in mind, it is interesting to note that the church has historically been stronger and grown relatively fast in 
areas more densely populated with members. 
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temple worship is not available until the member has put forth low-effort, the combined low-
effort and temple inputs are called high effort. 
To calculate the numbers in the matrix, we first must remember that if neither member 
puts forth high-effort, neither engages in temple worship. Hence, the sub-matrix representing 
these conditions is identical to the matrix in Figure 5.  To avoid redundancy, we will not 
calculate these numbers again.  In calculating the other numbers in the matrix, it is important to 
note that the benefits of temple worship benefit the temple-going member directly, with no 
associated external benefits.  It is also important to remember that temple worship is separate 
from regular worship.  Therefore, when we calculate the payoffs, we first calculate the payoff in 
regular church worship, and then include the temple payoff if the member has engaged in temple 
worship.   
We will also assume that the two members value temple benefits differently.  Member A 
receives two dollars net benefits for participating in temple worship (benefits subtract inputs).  
Member B, however, incurs a one dollar loss for engaging in temple worship (value of inputs 
exceeds benefits).  This difference could arise in many different ways.  Member B may live 
farther away from the temple, or may not have as much “faith” as Member A. 
For an example of how we calculate the payoffs, take the case where Member A shirks 
and Member B puts forth high-effort.  The payoffs from regular worship are the same as when 
Member B contributes fully and Member A shirks.  That payoff is (2, 1).  Then, since Member B 
participated in temple worship, he receives that payoff as well, which happens to be the loss of 
one dollar.  The final payoffs are then (2, 0).  The other cells of the matrix are calculated the 
same way and summarized in Figure 6. 
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    Member B 
    High‐Effort  Low‐Effort  Shirk 
Member A 
High‐Effort (5,2)  (5,3)*  (3,2) 
Low‐Effort (3,2)  (3,3)  (1,2) 
Shirk (2,0)  (2,1)  (2,2) 
Figure 6: The temple 
recommend matrix 
 
 In this game, it is Member A’s best strategy to put forth high-effort irrespective of what 
Member B does.  Member B’s best strategy depends on what Member A does, but since Member 
A’s strategy will be to put forth high-effort, Member B will act accordingly.  His best strategy is 
then to put forth low-effort.  Thus, the Nash equilibrium is where Member A puts forth high-
effort and Member B puts forth low-effort. 
 Notice the efficiency of this “menu” compared to the first club we analyzed in Figure 2.  
Whereas members had a strong incentive to free-ride in the first club, regardless of their 
commitment level, under the temple recommend menu, high-commitment members (temple 
goers) have a strong incentive to put forth high effort, and low-commitment members have 
incentives to contribute more than they would otherwise.  Thus, the church at least partially 
solves the free-rider problem.  This type of analysis provides a framework for analyzing the 
effects of the church’s temple recommend and other excludable benefits.  What the actual 
benefits of efficiency are for a church are unknown.   
 
VI. GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES 
The church has an ecclesiastical hierarchy, with a president, two counselors, and 12 men 
called apostles at the top.  The leadership is then organized geographically, with men known as 
19 
 
   
seventies presiding over different regions.  These regions are then divided into stakes, with stake 
presidents over them.  Finally, the stakes are divided into wards, presided over by bishops.  The 
ward is the fundamental unit of the church.  It is the ward that meets weekly for worship and 
organizes other social functions.  Ward assignments are given geographically.  Each ward is 
composed of members living within set, geographical boundaries.  
McBride mentions geographical boundaries in his analysis.  He points out the function 
they play in maintaining an optimal size of the club (an important aspect of club theory).  
However, the territorial boundaries affect more than just the size of the congregation.   
In an article discussing the trends of the Catholic church, Maines and McCallion (2004) 
focus particularly closely on “parish membership in relation to residence”.  In the Second 
Vatican Council, the Catholic church relaxed the requirement that “place was fate for Catholic 
parish choice”, focusing more on community than geography.  This effectively severed the tie 
between place of residence and choice of parish, giving the members the chance to choose their 
parish, and thus encouraging greater lay parish involvement.  Maines and McCallion thus see a 
direct link between lay involvement and choice of parish.  The question then becomes, why is 
“place” still “fate” for members of the LDS church?   
Geographical boundaries do not seem to exist to limit competition, and are ultimately 
unsuccessful in preventing individuals from choosing which ward they desire to attend4.  The 
answer lies in considerations of religious capital.  The menu of the church allows for high-
commitment (high-capital) members to invest in low-commitment (low-capital) members with 
the expectation that such investments will pay dividends for the church.  It would seem 
reasonable that there exists a certain ratio of high-capital members to low-capital members that 
                                                            
4 “Ward-shopping” when deciding where to live is not unheard of, although how common it is in practice is an 
empirical question. 
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would yield optimal results.  Geographical boundaries may be used to try to achieve this ratio in 
each ward.   
Such “investments” also require the development of trusting relationships between 
individual members and may require extended periods of time.  Since moving is not costless, 
geographical boundaries may be an attempt to create a greater degree of stability in the 
memberships of individual congregations.  This would give members more time to form the 
relationships needed for the creation of religious capital.   
 
VII. OTHER NOTES ON EFFICIENCY 
Minimum Requirements  
It is appropriate here to note an interesting feature of the minimum requirements 
necessary to obtain a temple recommend.  The minimum contributions necessary to obtain a 
temple recommend encompass several different aspects of worship (or inputs of production).  
Although it might make sense that these inputs would be interchangeable in terms of value, such 
is not the case.  Say, for example, that Bill is a member of the LDS church and also a successful 
career man.  Because of his career, contributing his time to the church is very costly.  He instead 
contributes money (in addition to his 10% tithe) to the church, in exchange for his lack of time 
contribution.  Although the value of his contribution may be equal to or more than that of the 
contribution of a member donating 10% and her time, Bill will not receive a recommend and the 
other member will.  This may seem irrational at first glance, but it does make sense.  The 
production of religious benefits requires all inputs (time, money, enthusiasm, etc).  These are not 
interchangeable.  The church cannot take Bill’s money and purchase the missing time 
commitment with it.  Although this may be possible in other types of production, it is not the 
21 
 
   
case with worship.  Thus, obtaining a temple recommend requires minimum amounts of all 
inputs.   
Monitoring  
Making sure that temple recommend candidates meet these requirements and that temple 
recommend holders maintain the same level of contribution requires extensive monitoring by the 
church leadership.  The church directs a significant amount of its human resources toward 
monitoring.  The church has fostered a culture of interviewing.  From the time members join the 
church or are old enough to talk, they begin learning that interviews are a normal part of 
membership.  At work or in any other club, it may be extremely strange for one man to interview 
another about sometimes very personal issues, but in the church, members are exposed to it often 
enough that it becomes part of the membership experience.  These interviews are the primary 
means by which the church leadership monitors its members as they progress to different 
callings, priesthood offices, and eventually temple attendance.   
Monitoring keeps the menu functioning as it should.  After all, if you didn’t have to 
actually contribute to obtain the excludable benefits, they are no longer excludable, and the 
incentive to free-ride is in full force.  Given the extraordinary effort the church makes to monitor 
its members, we can infer that the increased religious production due to efficiency warrants the 
monitoring costs. 
 
VIII. DISCUSSION 
 In summary, we have described and shown the free-riding problem faced by religious 
organizations and explained how the temple recommend is a possible solution to that problem as 
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it relates to the LDS church.   We have also noted several other features of the church as they 
relate to the temple recommend system, and some of the effects on efficiency they may have. 
 We conclude that the temple recommend and associated features possibly explain the 
overall efficiency of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints as a club producing 
religious benefits or capital.  This efficiency is a possible explanation for the relative success the 
LDS church has seen in terms of growth, retention, and the overall commitment of its members.  
The framework and methods used in this research may prove helpful in understanding and 
increasing the efficiency of other clubs facing the free-rider problem.  Approaches similar to the 
ones taken by the LDS church could have comparable results if it is reasonable for the club to 
employ such methods.  The specific effects geographical boundaries have on the production of 
religious capital, and the nature of the menu within LDS theology instead of the just the 
organization are subjects for future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
   
APPENDIX 1  
CLUBS  
Religious organizations are best understood as clubs, in the economic meaning of the 
term.  Clubs produce club goods.  A club good is one which is excludable and non-rivalrous.  To 
be excludable, the provider of the good must be able to determine who can and who cannot 
consume the good.  Most goods we typically think of are excludable because of price.  Price is 
the excluding factor because it excludes those unwilling to pay the specified cost.  In clubs, 
membership requirements make the club good excludable.  Baptism and adherence to certain 
commandments are typical excluding factors in Christian congregations.   
To be non-rivalrous, consumption of the good by one individual does not diminish the 
amount of the good available to others.  Most goods we think of are rivalrous.  If I purchase a 
new car from the local dealership, there is one less car for others to buy.  Examples of non-
rivalrous goods include air, FM/AM radio, and television broadcasts.  As for a club, as defined 
by economists, enjoyment of the club benefits by one member does not decrease the amount of 
benefits available to other members of the club.  Members of a congregation are not in 
competition for consumption of the religious benefits of worship.  Instead, they enjoy the 
benefits together and non-rivalrously. 
 Although excludability is a defining characteristic of a club good, this excludability 
breaks down when the club is analyzed by itself.  At the level of the club, the club benefits 
become public goods (non-excludable, non-rivalrous).  It is true that the club can exclude non-
members from enjoying club benefits, but many of those benefits are non-excludable within the 
club.  Benefits usually cannot be reserved for those members who contribute the most, and 
withheld from those contributing less.  Depending on the club it may be unethical to withhold 
benefits.  Perhaps measuring the members’ contribution is impossible, unjustifiable, or entails a 
cost making it impractical to do so.  Various aspects of the club can contribute to the non-
excludable nature of the club benefits.  
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